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I. INTRODUCTION
Sports are big business. The assertion has become a mantra for those
disenchanted with the current state of professional and amateur athletics.
However, recollection ofglory days is often obscured by the passage of time.
Sports, and in particular professional sports, have been a thriving industry for
over a century. Moreover, as with other industries, sports leagues' and
associations' conduct has been the subject of administrative and judicial
scrutiny for decades. In antitrust law, the 1922 Supreme Court decision in
Federal Baseball Club v. National League' marked the inception of Major League
This article was completed in early 1999 in conjunction with the author's LL.M. studies.
Subsequent developments in the ongoing lawsuits cited herein have not been incorporated. Nonetheless,
the relevance of such cases and the conclusions of this article, in the author's opinion, remain current.
I Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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Baseball's antitrust exemption. Other entities in the sports sector have not
been as fortunate.
Antitrust law is designed to promote competition in all aspects of
American life. It has been described as the "Magna Carta of free enterprise."2
Ideologically, competitive market forces will deliver the optimal social
outcomes.3 The concern is that, with respect to the sports industry, courts
have departed from this philosophy. Antitrust scrutiny of the conduct of
sports bodies has often been less rigorous than that of conventional
industries.4 However, the free market principles on which antitrust law is
based appear equally applicable in the sports context. This "policy of non-
enforcement," as some have described it, has effectively granted all
professional sports an exemption from antitrust laws.
5
Several justifications have been advanced for the generally deferential
approach ofthejudiciary. Most often, mention has been made to the unique
nature of organized sport, where "horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all."6 This view is prevalent in the
context of sports association equipment rules. Without standard rules of
play, no meaningful competition on the playing field can occur. However,
antitrust concerns may arise when the rules move beyond mere regulation
of play to the limitation of equipment used by the participants. The
governing bodies clearly see the latter as an extension of the former -
regulation of equipment is essential to the preservation of the game.
Unsurprisingly, in the view of a senior golf official, the purpose of the rules
2 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972), stated:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental freedoms. And
the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to
compete - to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic
muscle it can muster. Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with
respect to one sector of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that
such foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector of the
economy.
3 The Supreme Court conveyed this view in N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958),
stating that the basic premise of the Sherman Act was "that unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation
of our democratic political and social institutions."
4 Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace Competition in the
Marketplace?, 60 TENN. L. REv. 263,264 (1993).
5 John J. Scura, The Tine Has Come: Ending the Antitrust Non-Enforcement Policy in Professional
Sports, 2 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 151, 172-73 (1992).
6 NCAAv. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,101 (1984).
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
is "to preserve the traditions of the game, and to insure that a player's score
is the product of his skill, rather than his equipment.
"7
Conflicting influences cloud the antitrust analysis of such rules. To an
extent, equipment rules are undoubtedly essential for the sports product to
exist. Additionally, in other industries, standards set by joint venture parties
or trade associations often exhibit pro-competitive effects.' These factors
prompt some writers to suggest that no serious antitrust allegations can be
asserted against sports organizations for rules pertaining to the configuration
of playing venues, the playing equipment used, or the game's conduct.9
However, as detailed in other industries, product standards can have
significant anti-competitive effects, particularly on innovation.'" For this
reason, courts have been averse to dismissing such antitrust claims outright,
even in the context of sports organization equipment rules. Rather, they
have preferred to inquire into the competitive effects of the impugned rule.
In contrast to some commentators' views, the potential scope of
equipment rule antitrust litigation is significant. The history of the USGA
golf club rules and the NCAA aluminum baseball bat rules, two current areas
of controversy, illustrate this. These organizations' efforts and the opposition
they have encountered from sporting goods manufacturers are detailed in
Part II. The judiciary's attempts to resolve these types of disputes are
presented in Part III. The jurisprudence reveals that the courts have indeed
adopted a deferential approach, resorting to a rule of reason analysis of sports
organization rules. The judiciary, while balancing the procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects, routinely cedes to the unique nature of organized
sport in rejecting antitrust liability. However, the difficulty for sports
associations arises from the potential for liability. The lack of an explicit
exemption, despite de facto treatment as such with respect to rules regulating
equipment, leaves sports organizations vulnerable to antitrust litigation. The
experience of the PGA and USGA, discussed in Part II, reveals the value of
litigation threats. Given the approach adopted by the courts, the additional
step of limited antitrust immunity would permit sports organizations to
mandate the rules of play essential for the existence of their "product." In
this respect, a brief respite from judicial scrutiny would not harm
Affidavit of Frank Thomas, Technical Director of the USGAquoted in Weight-Rite Golf Corp.
v. USGA, 766 F. Supp. 1104,1107-08 (M.D. Fla. 1991),affd, 953 F.2d 651 (11th Cir. 1992).
8 Sean P. Gates, Standards, Innovations, andAntitrust: Integrating Innovation Concerns into theAnalysis
of Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 EMORY L.J. 583,583-84 (1998).
9 Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consuiner Wefare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2633
(1996).
10 Gates, supra note 8, at 584.
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competition. Rather, it would further the rationales of antitrust law, and
allow free competition to yield the optimal results.
II. CURRENT SPORTING GOODS MANUFACTURER - SPORTS
ASSOCIATION CONFLICTS
Some commentators have expressed considerable skepticism as to the
viability of antitrust claims by equipment manufacturers relating to playing
equipment standards established by sports leagues or associations."
Nonetheless, several sports regulatory bodies have encountered precisely
such claims.12 Recent events in several areas have triggered the potential for
future antitrust litigation. This section will review the two most prominent
instances, involving professional golP3 and college baseball. 4
A. The Rules of Gof
1. BACKGROUND
The sport of golf is overseen by the United States Golf Association
(USGA) in North America and by the Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St.
Andrew's (R&A) in the rest of the world. These bodies administer the Rules
of Golf in an effort to preserve the character and integrity of the game of
1 For example, Professor Gary Roberts stated that "[i]t would require an active imagination to
claim that any of the rules [that govern the actual conduct of athletic contests, including ... required
equipment] violate the rule of reason." See Gary R. Roberts, supra note 9, at 2648.
12 These cases will be discussed in Part III.
13 Golf equipment is a $2 billion industry worldwide, dominated by five firms: Titleist/Cobra,
Callaway, Taylor Made, SpaldingfTop Flite, and Karsten Manufacturing. See Gil Copps, High-Tech
Drivingfor Lower Scores, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTSBUSINESSJOURNAL, May 4-10, 1998, at 28.
14 Potential litigation is not limited to these sports, however. In recent years the Union Cycliste
Internationale (UCI) has banned extended handlebars designed to suit the "Superman" racing style of
bicyclist Graeme Obree. Previously, Obree's "toadstool"-shaped saddle was reected by the UCI. UCI
president Hein Verbruggen encapsulated the usual rationale behind such decisions: "We want riders to
win because they are the best, rather than because they have the best equipment." Thus, the UCI altered
their Article 49, governing both the rider's position and equipment. See Robin Nicholl, Obree's Riding
Position Banned, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Oct. 10, 1996, at 29; Robin Nicholl,Cycling: No Daylight
for Obreeas Riding Position Falls Foul of Rules, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Aug. 16, 1994, at 36. See also
Matthew E. Mantell, What is the UCI? Union Cyclistelnternationale, BICYCLING,June 1989, at 64 (providing
an overview ofthe administrative structure of the UCI);John Rofi,High-TechAdvances Drive Bike Market;
With Sales Sagging in the '90s, Innovations are Especially Inportant in Competitive Bicycle Industry, STREET &
SMITH'S SPORTSBUSINESSJOURNAL, Sept. 14-20, 1998, at 27 (describing role of innovation in the $5.2
billion cycling industry).
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golf.'5 Compliance with the Rules is mandated for all USGA-sanctioned
events. However, the majority of golf associations, including the
Professional Golfers' Association (PGA) Tour, voluntarily comply with the
Rules.' 6  The USGA-established standards and regulations for playing
equipment, an integral part of the Rules of Golf, have been the source of
contentious litigation in the past,17 and may again prove to be troublesome.
The golf equipment controversy of the late 1980s and early 1990s
centered on the legality of square grooved irons.19 This confrontation
originated between the USGA and Karsten Manufacturing, producer of the
Ping Eye2 golf club, and later included the PGA Tour. Traditionally, USGA
requirements limited the grooves on an iron's clubface to a V-shape.
Is Rules 4-1 to 4-3 set the general standards for golf clubs, while the more specific, technical
requirements found in Appendix II. Typically, clubs are submitted to the USGA for approval prior to
their use in USGA-sanctioned events: Mike Purkey, Equipment Rules; Golf Supply Standards of the United
States GofAssociation, GOLF MAGAZINE, Aug. 1993, at 70.
16 Frank Hannigan, The Right to Change the Rules; A Forner USGA Official Offers His Perspective on
the Debate, GOLF WORLD,June 5,1998. Seegenerally AL BARKOW, THE HISTORY OF THE PGAToUR (1st
ed. 1989); HERB GRAFFIS, THE PGA: THE OFFICAL HISTORY OF THE PROFESSIONAL GOLFERS'
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 416-38 (1975). David Fay, executive director of the USGA, commented on
the limitations inherent with this regulatory regime:
We write the rules and hope they are followed I don't think golfers disrespect the rules
wholesale. I think they follow the rules selectively. The rules of the game are so much more
complex than in any other sport and they always will be.
We remain committed to trying to educate people about the rules, but we can't put a gun to
their head and say play by the rules.
Alan Byrd, Q&A with David Fay, STREET& SMITH'S SPORTSBUSiNESSJOURNAL, May 10-14, 1998, at 32-
33.
17 One example is the antitrust suit launched against the USGA by Weight-Rite. The suit was
precipitated by the USGA's rejection of Weight-Rite's golf shoe, which purportedly provided illegal
support to a golfer during the swing motion. A substantive discussion of the Weight-Rite litigation is
included in Part III.
Apart from manufacturers, who clearly are self-interested, there are others in the golf world
that doubt the alleged deleterious effects of innovations in golf equipment. Frank Thomas, who served
as technical director of the USGA for more than 21 years, stated that, in his estimation, "equipment has
had virtually no measurable effect on the game in the last 30 years." In the antitrust context, such
opinions contribute to the uncertainty surrounding USGA claims that limitations on equipment are
necessary to preserve the integrity of the game of golf. SeeJaime Diaz, Doubting Thomas; Frank Thomas
of the USGA is Skeptical About Claims That Modern Equipment is Ruining the Game, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
July 3, 1995, at G10.
Is • Hannigan, supra note 16. For example, Callaway Golf Co. has threatened legal action in
response to the USGA proposals on the "spring-like" effect, discussed below. John Lombardo, Help or
Hype? New Clubs Spur Debate; Gof Comnpanies are Falling Over Thmnselves in Comning Up With 'Better' - and
Costlier - Equipment, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTSBUSINESSJOURNAL, Sept. 14-20, 1998, at 24.
19 For a detailed review of the factual history, see Gilder v. PGA Tour, 727 F.Supp. 1333 (D.Ariz.
1989), aftd, 936 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1991).
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However, changes in the wording of the USGA rule in 1983 first permitted
square grooves.20 Subsequent testing revealed the performance-enhancing
effects of the new technology. The studies conducted by the USGA
indicated that square grooves produced a higher spin rate, as compared to V-
shaped clubs, in medium to light rough. 2' The significance of this revelation
was clear to professional golfers. With more spin came more control. The
USGA's contention was that players with longer but more inaccurate drives
accrued an advantage - they could now "swing for the greens," for the
consequences of hitting out of the rough had been limited.
In June 1987, the USGA ruled that the Ping Eye2 clubs, the most
popular irons in golf history at that time, did not conform to USGA
standards. The association declared the club illegal because its square
grooves were too close together, and thus produced excessive spin.2 Karsten
Manufacturing sued, and the USGA quickly settled. Under the settlement,
the Ping Eye2 irons were declared legal on the condition that future models
manufactured by Karsten would have the grooves further apart. However,
the PGA Tour then intervened and took the extraordinary step of declaring
all square-grooved clubs illegal. Deane Beman, commissioner of the PGA
Tour, reasoned that "[t] he historical role of ruling on equipment is not ours.
But the technology and sophistication of the manufacturers has outstripped
the ability of the USGA and the R&A to oversee the game. Litigation will
continue to play a role in that."' In banning the square grooves, antitrust
concerns necessitated the abstention of seven members of the Tour's 10-
member policy board due to their contractual ties to equipment
manufacturers.24
Karsten Manufacturing and a group of professional golfers, users of the
Ping Eye2, sought to enjoin the PGA Tour from implementing its ban on
square-grooved irons. Karsten initiated a lawsuit in response to the PGA
30 The rule change was adopted as a result oftechnological improvements in the manufacturing
of iron heads. Manufacturers had shifted from traditional forging process to the investment-cast process.
However, these developments resulted in U-shaped grooves, rather than V-shaped. The wording of the
rule was altered to incorporate this new design. SeeJaime Diaz, Has Golf Gotten Too Groovy?, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 3, 1987, at 52.
21 Id. See also E.M. Swift, Choose Your Weapon; GolffTethnology has Taken a Quantum Leap, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, July 9, 1990, at 40.
The amount of spin generated by the club is a result of several factors, including the shape of
the grooves, the width of each groove and the distance between the grooves. An improvement by Karsten
to the square grooves (specifically, the rounding of the grooves' edges) triggered a violation of the USGA's
regulations with respect to the distance between the clubs. Diaz,supra note 20.
3 Swift, supra note 21.
24 Jaime Diaz, PGA Tour Counters Imnagefron Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, at 8:6. See also
PAUL C. WEILER AND GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, PROBLEMS 904-05 (2nd
ed. 1998)
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Tour ban, claiming violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act..2 s Thus, to ensure the validity of the ban, the PGA Tour revised its by-
laws relating to quorum requirements and subsequently readopted the square
groove rule.26 Despite the steps taken by the PGA Tour, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the injunction preventing the Ping Eye2's ban from the PGA
Tour.27 The court, while not expressing an opinion on the antitrust issues
"other than they are not insubstantial," held that the balance of hardships
weighed in favor of the manufacturer and the professional players.28 Then,
on the eve of trial, like the USGA before it, the PGA Tour settled with
Karsten.
Under the terms of the settlement, the PGA Tour rescinded its ban on
the use of square-grooved clubs in Tour events, and pledged not to institute
any future rule prohibiting such clubs unless the USGA took such steps.'
In so doing, the PGA Tour and Karsten acknowledged "that the USGA is the
principal rule-making body of golf.""' However, the settlement also called
for the PGA Tour's formation of a five-member equipment advisory
committee. The independent committee would study any equipment
matters that arise and would make recommendations to the Tournament
Policy Board.3' Both sides claimed victory with the settlement. For Karsten,
the legal wrangling over the Ping Eye2 irons had ended, with continued use
of the clubs on the professional tour cemented. For the PGA Tour, the
establishment of the advisory committee affirmed that it had retained the
right to make determinations on equipment independently of the USGA.32
15 U.S.C. SS 1, 2 (2002).
26 Gilder, 727 F.Supp. at 1334.
" Gilder v. PGA Tour, 936 F. 2d 417 (9th Cir. 1991).
28 Id. at 422-24. The Ninth Circuit found that the alleged harm to the PGA Tour in the form
of damage to its reputation as a sports governing body was speculative in relation to the concrete harm that
would be suffered by Karsten (in terms of lost sales) and the professional golfer plaintiffs (in terms of lost
tournament earnings).
-9 Joe Strauss, Ping Settlrnent Avoids Lawsuit Against PGA, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL AND
CONSTITUTION, Apr. 15, 1993, at G3; Joe Strauss, Square Groove Controversy: Ping Changes Face of Gof;
Inventor Faces Dovn PGA Tour Over Ban ofhis Clubs, THEATLANTAJOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION, Apr.
16, 1993, at E10.
30 Square Deal: The PGA Tour and Karsten Manufacturing Solved Their Dispute Over Square Grooves
Out of Court, GOLF MAGAZINE, June 1993, at 142.
31 Larry Dorman, PGA SettledSuit, But Won Equipment War, FORT IAUDERDALESUN-SENTINEL,
Apr. 18, 1993, at 9C.
32 Id. Not all members of the golf community saw the establishment of the advisory committee
as a beneficial result of the settlement. ChuckYash, President and CEO of Taylor Made Golf Co. stated:
The USGA is set up to control and uphold the game. As a result, the Tour doesn't need to
have an implements committee. I don't think it's right for [PGA Tour Commissioner] Deane
and the PGA Tour to have their own set of rules. It is necessary that the Tour and the USGA
communicate and work better together.
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Nonetheless, the USGA has remained at the forefront on issues of golf
equipment standards.
2. THE SPRING-LIKE EFFECT
The most recent conflict between the USGA and golf manufacturers
arose from the interpretation of Rule 4-1e, Appendix II, which states that the
"material and construction of the club shall not have the effect at impact of
a spring."33 In June 1998, the USGA announced that the rule would be clari-
fied through the implementation of a test devised to measure the spring-like
effect of clubs.' The USGA's concern was that the advent of new materials
in the construction of golf clubs had begun to impart a trampoline effect on
golf clubs, with a resulting increase in shot distance. 5 Previously, no tool
was available to measure this effect. While the USGA indicated that virtually
all existing clubs would pass the proposed test, manufacturers expressed con-
36cern as to the rule's effect on future innovations in golf club construction.
Thus, golf equipment manufacturers, whose stock prices dropped as a
result, met the USGA announcement with apprehension.37 As one
33 Press Release, United States GolfAssociation, USGA Proposes Conformance Test for"Spring-
Like" Effect in Golf Clubs Uune 17,1998). Rule 4-le in Appendix II, in its entirety, states: "The material
and construction of the face shall not have the effect at impact of a spring, or impart significantly more
spin to the ball than a standard steel face, or have any other effect which would unduly influence the
movement of the ball."
34 Jaime Diaz, The Buzz Bomb; Loose Talk by the New USGA President has an Entire idust on Edge,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 8, 1998, at G24 (evaluating methods undertaken by new USGA president
Buzz Taylor).
35 The theoretical effect has been expressed as follows:
[A] trampoline effect occurs when a clubface bends inward at impact with a golf
ball, then reverts to its original position, propelling the ball farther than it would have gone had
the clubface been rigid.
"The basic theory is that most of the energy lost at impact is lost in the golf ball
squashing up against the face," said Art Chou of the Chou Golf, a club design consultant. "If
you can minimize the amount ofdeformation the ball goes through, you maximize the energy
transfer at impact. When the face gives a little bit, the ball is deforming less. It allows the ball
to retain more of its own energy." Ergo, the ball travels farther.
John Strege, What's a Trampoline Effect? GOLF WORLD, June 5,1998.
36 T.R. Reinman, Investors Applaud as USGA Retrieves Go, Club Gauntlet, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE,June 18,1998, at Cl; USGA Won't DearellealAny Golf Clubs That HaveAlready Been Approved,
THE FINANCIAL POsT,June 18, 1998, at 69; Frederick Rose, USGA Plan Won't Bar Old Gear, THEWALL
STREETJOURNAL EUROPE, at 9; Claudia Rosett, USGA Sets Linits on Use ofSome Clubs, But Allovs Big-
Headed Drivers in Play, THE WALL STREET JoURNAL, June 18, 1998, at A6; Big Bertha Gets Off With a
Warning, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTBUSINESSJOURNAL, June 22-28, 1998, at 3.
37 Some manufacturers were ofthe opinion that if the USGA took such steps it would "no longer
be able to govern the game with consent of those it governs." Ely Callaway, founder of Callaway Golf,
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investment analyst commented, "[i]f a governing body tells a leading-edge
technology company that they can't improve technology, it puts them out of
business."38  Meanwhile, the PGA Tour was hesitant to intervene in the
matter, as many of the affected manufacturers were major sponsors in
supporting the Tour's new television package.39 Undaunted, the USGA
proceeded with the distribution ofthe proposed test procedure, and solicited
comments from manufacturers on the proposalU) On September 28, 1998,
the process, which commenced nearly ten months earlier, continued with a
notice and comment review of the proposed test protocol.4' At the open
forum, manufacturers had an additional opportunity to address the USGA
proposal. John Solheim, President of Karsten Manufacturing, succinctly
presented the equipment industry's position:
Golf is hundreds of years old. Innovation in golf is hundreds of
years old....
The USGA repeatedly states that one of its responsibilities is to
protect the "traditions of the game." That, ofcourse, means different
things to different people. However, one of the widely agreed upon
beliefs in the golf community is that innovation is one of the
important traditions of golf. The rules of golf have always left room
for equipment innovation....
If the USGA restricts innovation, it will artificially restrict
competition. Golfers will no longer receive the best possible
equipment and will incorrectly perceive that all golf drivers are the
quoted in John Strege, Living on Bomvted Time? The USGA Could be Ready to Take Some Titanium-Faced
Drivers Out of Play, GOLF WORLD, May 29, 1998. Compare with Daniel Kaplan, Bertha's Got Bounce - Too
Much; Popular Callaway Line of Titanium-Faced Clubs May be Banned by PGA, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTSBUSINESS JOURNAL, May 18-24, 1998, at 5 (citing opinion that rule changes could benefit
manufacturers by necessitating purchases of new, compliant clubs).
38 Steve Eubanks, Market Economics; USGA Action Could Affect More Than Just Golf Companies,
GOLF WORLD, June 5,1998.
39 Tim Rosaforte, No Rush tojudgment, GOLF WORLD,June 5, 1998. The PGA Tour's executive
vice president of competitions, Bill Calfee, stated that the Tour's focus was different from the USGA's
in that the Tour concentrated on the effect of technolgy on the best players, at the highest level of
competition. He continued, "We care about the game, and that includes the manufacturers." Id.
40 Press Release, United States Golf Association, USGA Distributes Details of Proposed Test for
"Spring-Like" Effect in Golf Clubs (July 13, 1998).
41 Press Release, United States Golf Association, USGA Holds Open Forum on Spring-Like
Effect Test Protocol (Sept. 29, 1998); Opening Comments of Gordon Brewer, chairman of the USGA's
implements and ball committee, at USGA Open Forum on Spring-Like Effect Test Protocol, in Basking
Ridge, NJ available at http://www.usga.org/testcenter/transcript/opening_proceedings.html.
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same and there is nothing new or improved. The lack of excitement
from the game will decrease interest in golf.....
If the USGA adopts this proposed rule, it will hurt manufacturers,
golfers, golf, and, most of all, the USGA. Some golfers will buy
equipment that [the USGA is] trying to prohibit. In short, golfers
will begin to ignore the USGA's... rules limiting innovation. This
will lead to a loss of respect for the USGA.42
Despite the concerns voiced by manufacturers, and their related threats of
legal action, the USGA has proceeded with the implementation of the new
clubface test.43 Thus, the lines in the sand had been drawn for the next legal
confrontation between golf's governing bodies and its equipment
manufacturers.'
B. NCAA Rules forAluminum Bats
Since 1974, the NCAA has approved the use of aluminum bats in
collegiate baseball. 4' The move to aluminum was predicated on its sizable
cost savings over traditional wood bats. The widespread use of aluminum in
collegiate and amateur baseball even prompted some experts to predict that,
42 Submissions ofJohn Solheim, President of Karsten Manufacturing, at USGA Open Forum
on Spring-Like Effect Test Protocol, in Basking Ridge, NJ, available at
http://www.usga.org/testcenter/transcript/karsten.htm. Another view advanced in the indusry is that
rule changes should be limited to professional golfers, with the amateur game left unaltered. The
rationale is that amateurs can still benefit from equipment improvements that would increase their
enjoyment of the sport. See Dan Crawford, Q&A with James R. Baugh, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTSBUSINESS JOURNAL, Sept. 14-20, 1998, at 28-30 (interview with president of Wilson Sporting
Goods Co.). This position is supported by the view of some equipment manufacturers that two distinct
golf equipment markets exist, one consisting of professional golfers, the other comprising the rest of
golfers. See Lombardo, supra note 18.
43 Press Release, United States Golf Association, USGA to Strengthen Equipment Standards
(Nov. 2, 1998); John Holmes, USGA Proceeds with New Ball and Club Tests, at
http://golf.conm/news/view.cgi?19981102145523.tor. In addition to the clubface test, the USGA
announced new standards for golf balls, including an update to the current overall distance standard
(ODS).
4 "With respect to litigation, we have faced this matter before and that doesn't influence how we
go about doing our business." David Fay, Executive Director, USGA, at USGA Press Conference with
Buzz Taylor, President, USGA, and Trey Holland, VP, USGA, at
http'/www.usga.org/testcenter/fay buzz-confernce.html.
45 Peter Gammons, End of an Era; What Would the Babe Think? The Crack f the Wooden Bat is Being
Replaced by the Ping ofAluminum. And by the End of the Next Decade, the Ping is Likely to be Heard in the Majors,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 24, 1989, at 17.
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eventually, professional baseball would undergo the transition as well.
6
Over the past two decades, the advent of lighter metal bats, constructed from
new aluminum alloys, increased the speed and power that hitters could
generate. In response, the NCAA prescribed maximum length-to-weight
unit differentials for bats.47 In limited instances, the NCAA, citing safety
considerations, rejected bat models that did not comply with its
specifications. 48 Then, in May 1998, the NCAA, seeking to establish more
specific performance standards, joined the Sporting Goods Manufacturers
Association (SGMA) and other governing bodies of amateur baseball in an
extensive research program on aluminum bats.49
However, the NCAA Baseball Rules Committee did not await the results
of the joint research program. In August 1998, the Committee announced
that it had voted to recommend "a maximum batted-ball exit velocity and a
change in the size and weight specifications of nonwood baseball bats
beginning with the 1999 intercollegiate season." ° The new rules were
designed to limit the performance of metal bats to the level of their wooden
counterparts. The NCAA executive committee subsequently approved the
changes, but pushed back the implementation date to August 1, 1999, making
the rules effective for the 2000 season.5'
46 Id. By 1997, bat sales totaled $82.1 million, with aluminum bats accounting for 90% of bats
sold. Bill King, NCAA May Disable High-Tech 'Lumber'; Potent Metal Bats Changing the College Game so
Radically that Manufacturers Forced on the De'ensit'e, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTSBUSINESS JOURNAL, Sept.
14-20, 1998, at 22.
47 For example, in 1988, the NCAA baseball committee instituted a maximum differential of five
- dictating that a thirty-four-inch-long bat could weigh no less than twenty-nine ounces. See Press
Release, National Collegiate Athletic Association, NCAA Joins SGMA in Baseball Testing Procedure
(May 29, 1998); Ed Guzman and Kirk Johnson, Baseball: More Hits, More Runs, And More Concerns; Hkqh-
Tech Bats Overiower the Game, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1998, at 8:1.
48 Robert Williams, NCAA Rejects One Bat Model, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Dec. 21,1995, at 33
(reporting on NCAA rejection ofC405 bat model based on failure in tests of maximum bat performance
factor (BPF)). According to Ted Breidenthal, staff liaison with the NCAA Baseball Rules Committee,
the NCAA keys on three issues: "The first is safety, risk minimization. The second is competitive balance
in terms of offense vs. defense. The third is protecting the game's integrity." Carolyn White, Standards
for Bats to be Set, USA TODAY, Aug 5, 1998, at 12C.
49 NCAA Press Release (May 29, 1998), supra note 47. Major League Baseball and Rawlings
Sporting Equipment Co. also recently agreed to fund the development of a new bat-testing lab, with the
aim of constructing metal bats that perform like wood. PeterJ. Howe,Removing the Bash From Metal Bats;
Umass Engineer Asked to Quell College Long Ball, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 15,1998, at B1.
so Press Release, National Collegiate Athletic Association, NCAA Committee Recommends
Baseball Bat Performance Standard, New Specs for 1999(Aug. 6, 1998).
s1 Guzman and Johnson,supra note 47; Baseball; Changes Seen for Metal Bats, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1998, at C2; Lon Eubanks, NCAA Mutes the Bats; College Baseball: Changes in Specifications Will Limit Home
Run Potential Beginning with the 2000 Season, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1998. The rule changes adopted were:
(a) a maximum batted-ball speed that a bat could produce of ninety-three mph (previously no limit); (b)
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Easton Sports, Inc., a leading manufacturer of aluminum bats, responded
by filing a $267 million antitrust suit against the NCAA.12 Easton claimed
that the rules changes would render $140 million worth of bats in its inven-
tory obsolete, and that two years would be required for the company to adapt
to the new requirements. 3 Easton also alleged collusion between the NCAA
and the only manufacturer whose metal bats complied with the new
standards.' In establishing its claim, Easton asserted that the anti-
competitive effects of the new rules were:
(a) It will reduce the quality of baseball bats in the relevant market,
and deprive purchasers in the relevant market of the benefits of
quality competition.
(b) It will require all college players to abandon the baseball bats
they currently own, and purchase all new baseball bats, with the
likely additional expense of at least $25,000,000.00. This is the
equivalent of a substantial increase in the price of baseball bats.
a maximum diameter of 2 5/8 inches (a decrease of 1/8 inch); and (c) a maximum length-to-weight
differential of three (i.e. a thirty-four inch bat must weigh at least thirty-one ounces).
s2 The claim was later amended to $237 million following the NCAA's decision to implement
the rule changes for the 2000 season. Steve Rock, Bat Manufacturer Amends Complaint Against NC,A,
KANSAS CITY STAR, Sept. 11, 1998, at D6; Complaint for Damages and Preliminary Injunctive Relief,
Easton Sports, Inc. v. NCAA, No. 98-CV-2351 (D. Kan. 1998) (hereinafterEaston Complaint).
53 Eubanks, supra note 51; NCAA Approves Changes in Bats; Organization Now Must Fight $267
Million Suit, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 13, 1998, at C3; Ed Guzman, Baseball; New Rulesfor
Metal Bats Alarm a Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1998, at C3; King, supra note 46. Another manufacturer,
Rawlings Sports, ceased production of2 3/4 inch barrel bats in response to the NCAA rule change. The
company was forced to "dump" the non-compliant bats in its inventory, with losses estimated at $400,000.
Daniel Kaplan, Rawlings Takes a Hit Over New NCAA Bat Rule, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTSBUSINESS
JOURNAL, Sept. 21-27, 1998, at 14.
54 NCAA Approves Changes in Bats; Organization Now Must Fight $267 Million Suit, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 13, 1998, at C3; Easton Complaint, supra note 52, at 10. Incidentally, the
same manufacturer, Baum Research and Development Co. ("Baum"), also designed the bat-testing
machine used by the NCAA.
In fact, the current rash of litigation was initiated by Baum, and its principal, Steve Baum, with
a suit filed against the NCAA, the SGMA, Hillerich & Bradsby Co., Easton Sports, Inc. and Worth, Inc.
See Baum Research and Development Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., No. 98-72946 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
Baum, a manufacturer of wood composite bats, contended that the named defendants conspired toprevent
the NCAA from prescribing limits on the performance of aluminum bats. As counsel for Hillerich &
Bradsby Co. stated, Baum "ironically argues that the antitrust laws were violated because the NCAA did
not sufficiently limit competition among metal bat manufacturers in making better metal bats for college
play." Third Party Movant Hillcrich & Bradsby Co.'s Notice of Motion and Motion to Quash
Subpoenas; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 1-2, No. 98-CV-8640 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (emphasis added). The NCAA's new aluminum bat rule was passed subsequent to the filing
of the Baum suit. Id. at 4. This litigation history presents one possible basis for Easton's conspiracy
allegation against the NCAA.
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(c) It will substantially inhibit research and development,
innovation and future competition to improve the quality of
baseball bats.
(d) The NCAA's action with regard to baseball and other sports are
often followed by other sanctioning bodies . . . These
sanctioning bodies are likely to follow the NCAA's actions. If
they do so, these same anticompetitive effects will be felt by their
players."5
The SGMA echoed Easton's discontent with the NCAA's actions, calling
the Baseball Rules Committee's recommendations unwarranted, and
expressing concern that the NCAA disregarded its recent agreement to
conduct joint research on the subject.5 6 Critics of the rules changes asserted
that no legitimate safety concerns existed, and that the NCAA's actions were
precipitous and in restraint of trade." Still recovering from the "restricted-




Sports organizations, professional and amateur, are not exempt from the
application of federal antitrust law. 9 Only Major League Baseball enjoys
antitrust immunity; "[ojther professional sports operating interstate -
football, boxing, basketball, and presumably, hockey and golf- are not so
exempt."6° In particular, courts have held both professional golf and
collegiate athletics to be within the scope of the Sherman Act.6' The
ss Easton Complaint, supra note 52, at 20.
56 SGMA Calls NCAA's Recommendation to Outlaw All Existing Aluminum Bats Unwarranted,
BUSINESS WIRE, Aug. 11, 1998.
57 Guzman and Johnson, supra note 47; Easton Complaint, supra note 52, at 12-15.
s8 See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and
Consumer Wefare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631.
59 Scurasupra note 5, at 158; Gunter Harz Sports, Inc., v. USTA, 511 F. Supp. 1103,1114 (1981),
affid, 665 F. 2d 222 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Non-profit voluntary associations which sanction and regulate
professional sporting tournaments, races and other contests have been held sulbect to the antitrust laws
in the exercise of their rule-making authority.").
60 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,282-83 (1972).
61 PeterJ. Carton,Jr., Sports SelfGowrnance: Is it th Noblest Form orArbitrariness?, 1 SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 95,98 (1991); NCAA, 468 U.S. 85; Deesen v. Prof'l Golfers' Ass'n ofAm., 385 F.2d 165 (9th
Cir. 1966); Blalock v. Ladies Prof'l Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1263 (N.D. Ga. 1973). The court in
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applicability of antitrust law reinforces the belief that competition enhances
consumer welfare in all sectors of the economy. Claims as to the unique
nature of the business - essentially claims that "competition does not work
well in the sports industry" - can consequently be regarded as inconsistent
with the foundations of antitrust policy.' Therefore, some have argued that
the sports industry should be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as other
segments of the economy. If other values are deemed more virtuous than
competition, then a legislative solution should be sought. Thus, Professor
Lazaroff concludes:
One could argue that the psychological, social, and economic
benefits people derive from having a local baseball team outweigh
the industry's and society's interest in free and open competition.
However, it would require legislative action to give effect of law to
that value judgment. It is not for litigants or judges to argue that
competition itself is unreasonable. The antitrust laws should not be
warped by strained interpretations to achieve results they were never
intended to produce.63,
Congress has yet to enact that value judgment. Consequently, antitrust
law has continually been warped to address the unique aspects of the sports
industry. Self-regulatory rule enforcement is an essential element of
governance for both professional sports leagues and sports associations that
oversee the operation of non-league activities.' 4 So long as these rules relate
to the organization's commercial or business activities, or have an effect on
the business activities of competitors, antitrust legislation may operate to
restrict rule-making authority.65 Sports equipment manufacturers, who
allegedly are harmed by equipment limitations, thus have a tool to confine
the actions of sports' governing bodies. In the absence of legislative
protection, adaptability of the law is essential to ensure the continued
viability of professional and amateur athletics. Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, the law's pliability is achieved through both the standard of
Blalock substantiated its application of antitrust law to the activities of the Ladies PGA by reference to the
Supreme Court's dicta in Flood.
6' Daniel E. LazaroffAntitrust Analysis and Sports Leagues: Re-examining the Threshold Questions, 20
ARiz. ST. L.J. 953, 983 (1988).
63 Id. at 987-88 (footnotes omitted).
64 Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging
Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMi L. REV. 729, 731, n.4 (1987).
65 Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185-86 (3rd Cir. 1998) (holding NCAA eligibility rules
primarily seek to ensure fair competition in collegiate athletics and thus are outside the scope of the
Sherman Act).
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analysis chosen and the consideration of a wide range ofjustifications for the
impugned conduct. Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court's
deferential consideration of the organization's motives and rationales serves
a similar purpose. Therefore, despite the objections of Professor Lazaroff,
judicial tolerance has proven vital for sports associations in the face of
potential antitrust liability.
B. Some Preliminary Questions
An initial question facing sporting goods manufacturers is how best to
frame their antitrust claims. This strategic concern arises due to the
deference that most courts extend to self-regulatory rule enforcement. As
will be discussed below, a rule of reason analysis under Section 1 tends to
operate in favor of defendants in the sports industry. Thus, to escape strict
rule of reason scrutiny, potential plaintiffs possess two alternatives. First,
many plaintiffs present both group boycott and conspiracy issues under
Section 1 in an attempt to drive the analysis of the court to general antitrust
principles. 66 Second, some plaintiffs claim violations of the Section 2
prohibition against monopolization.67 Despite these strategies, the path to a
successful claim is fraught with obstacles. Therefore, at this initial stage,
contemplation of another potential impediment is required.
Since Section 1 violations require an agreement or conspiracy between
two or more parties, the threshold question of whether the sports
organization is within the ambit of the section must also be addressed. Some
professional leagues have asserted a "single entity" defense to Section 1
liability, claiming that they their conduct is unilateral and not within the
scope of concerted activity prohibited by Section 1.8 Professional leagues
argue that the league product is a result of joint cooperation, and thus
conceive of the league as an indivisible unit. However, sports leagues have
had limited success with the single entity defense as a means to avoid
66 Carton, supra note 61, at 106.
67 Id. For example, Karsten's complaint against the USGA incorporated both these approaches.
Under S 1, Karsten alleged the conduct of the PGA, USGA and their members constituted an illegal
contract, combination and conspiracy to boycott its products. Under S 2, Karsten alleged that the USGA
and R&A constituted a monopoly power with respect the determination of the Rules of Golf and the
nature of golf equipment approved for play. Therefore, the claim proceeded, in failing to use their power
fairly and equitably with respect to the Ping Eye2 irons ban, the USGA and R&A caused economic harm
to Karsten in violation of S 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at n. 113.
68 Lazaroff, supra note 62, at 954-55; Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 740-48. See generally Myron
C. Grauer, The Use and Misuse of the Tenn "Consumer Wefare": Once More to the Mat on the Issue of Single
Entity Statusfor Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 TUL. L. REV. 71 (1989).
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antitrust investigation. 69 Team members of sports leagues do not possess the
complete unity of interest required of single entities - either because they
have the ability to produce a product without the league,7° or because
individual teams within a league compete with each other in many respects.
71
The uncertainty encountered with the single entity defense remains a
concern even where league structures are not prevalent. The USGA and
PGA, for example, have structures that more closely resemble a single entity.
Therefore, some courts have concluded that the PGA and one of its member
sections were incapable of conspiring under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.72
On the other hand, the NCAA, which consists of hundreds of member
schools, has a far more limited ability to seek immunity for its unilateral
conduct.73 Regardless of the viability of the single entity defense, Section 1
claims will continue to be instituted against governing sports bodies. For, as
was the case with the suit initiated by Easton against the NCAA,
manufacturers can readily insinuate conspiracies or agreements between the
association and other entities in the sports industry.74
Finally, it is important to note at the outset that manufacturers seeking
to challenge equipment limitations established by a sports association face a
double hurdle. First, even within the sports industry, courts appear to be
most deferential to sports associations. This may be due to the judiciary's
recognition of the non-economic purposes that many of these organizations
pursue.75 Second, courts have begun to recognize the beneficial effects of
standard setting, including conveying information about the product,
regulating quality, reducing inefficient variety, and ensuring compatibility.
76
Thus, courts will be averse to dismissing standards outright despite their
facially anticompetitive effects." These two factors pose serious
69 Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 782-83. The conception of a league as a single entity is relevant
with respect to the rule of reason analysis under S 1, however. As a single unit, leagues can argue that
their rules improve their "league product" and thus stimulate interbrand competition in the entertainment
market. Id. at 749 n. 82. In addition, under S 2, conceiving of a league as a single entity, competing against
other forms of entertainment, decreases the likelihood of a finding that a particular league possesses
sufficient monopoly power to invoke antitrust liability. Id. at 744 n.60. See Bauer, supra note 4, at 276.
70 Lazaroff, supra note 62, at 958-60 (reminiscing to the barnstorming teams earlier in the 20th
century).
71 Id. at 966.
72 Seabury Management, Inc. v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of Am., Inc., 878 F.Supp. 771, 777
(D.Md. 1994), affld in part, rev'd in part, 52 F.3d. 322 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995).
73 This was confirmed by the Supreme Court's treatment of the NCAA in NCAA, 468 U.S. 85.
74 See text accompanying note 54.
73 Neal R. Stoll and Shepard Goldfein, Sports Assoiation Equipment Curbs, NEw YORK LAW
JOURNAL, Oct. 16, 1990, at col. 1.
76 Gates, supra note 8, at 597.
n Id. at 597-98, 613.
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impediments to successful claims by manufacturers. It is therefore
unsurprising that rules governing the standardization of playing equipment
are usually upheld.7" Nonetheless, threats of antitrust litigation proceed -
and the mere potential of liability continues to influence the activities of
sports' governing bodies.
C. Section 1: Restraint of Trade
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits conspiracies79 or
concerted group activity designed to restrain trade among those who would,
absent an agreement, be competitors." The section extends beyond explicit
"agreements" to cover both tacit and other non-traditional arrangements.
For example, in Gunter Harz Sports Inc. v. United States Tennis Federation,
discussed below, the court held that the adoption of International Tennis
Federation rules by the United States Tennis Association constituted an
agreement under Section 1.81 The categorization of the impugned conduct
has a significant effect on the initial step in the Section 1 analysis, the
determination of the appropriate standard of review.
1. THE CHOICE OF PER SE OR RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS
Business activities subject to Section 1 may encounter two varying
standards of review. Some types of concerted conduct are so contrary to
public policy that they are treated as per se illegal. They are held to be
unlawful restraints of trade without an investigation as to possible
justifications or procompetitive effects.8 2 In general, a narrow range of
practices is subject to the per se rule, including group boycotts, price fixing,
78 Bauer, supra note 4, at 287.
7 Conspiracy claims require proof of agreement the members with respect to the restraining
conduct. In the past, such claims have been rejected against the USGA, since golf's governing body does
not force its members to enforce its interpretations of the Rules of Golf in tournaments conducted by its
members. Rather, the USGA governs solely through the consent of its constituents. Wigh*-Rite, 766
F.Supp. at 1108-09.
8D Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 735. S 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in the restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states... is declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and on conviction thereof, shall be punished.
15 U.S.C. S 1 (1982).
81 GunterHarz, 511 F. Supp. at 1115.
82 Carton, supra note 61, at 100; Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 735-37.
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tying arrangements, and concerted refusals to deal. 3 Application of the per
se rule is restricted to naked restraints of trade, where the conduct has "a
pernicious effect on competition and lack[s] any redeeming virtue."84
Therefore, courts often resort to a rule of reason test, where the procompetitive
justifications and anticompetitive harms of the impugned activity are
considered. The illegality of the restraint is assessed by its overall effect on
competition.8 '
Courts have resisted subjecting activity in the sports industry to aper se
rule. The preference for rule of reason scrutiny is often justified by the
unique qualities of the professional and amateur sports regimes.8 6
Additionally, the judiciary's unfamiliarity with particular organizational
structures often necessitates an inquiry into the effects of the restraints
imposed. Courts thus prefer the rule of reason test when confronted with
sports industry business practices.' A rule of reason inquiry permits a court
to unveil the valid business purposes and procompetitive virtues behind
allegedly restraining conduct.s' Accordingly, unlike per se condemnation, a
rule of reason approach affords courts with invaluable flexibility while
undertaking its antitrust analysis.'
a3 Carton, supra note 61, at 100; Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 735-36; Lazaroff, supra note 62, at
971 n. 80; Scura, supra note 5, at 155.
94 Northern Par. Ry, 356 U.S. at 5; E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consol. Air Tour, Man. Com.,
467 F.2d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972).
85 Lazaroff, supra note 62, at 972; Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 736-37.
06 Professional leagues often argue that they are unique in their resemblance to a single entity,
to the extent that cooperation among members is a prerequisite for increasing the attractiveness of the
"league product." Thus, facially restrictive practices can possess redeeming qualities for competition in
the wider entertainment market. In addition, this unique structure prompts practices that are outside the
traditionalperse categories, i.e. group boycotts by firms with market power disadvantaging their competitors.
Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 75. In the case of many restraints imposed by sports leagues, the affected
parties are not competitors, but other parties (e.g. player restraints, equipment limitations). Bauer, supra
note 4, at 278 n.67.
87 See Scura, supra note 5, at 156 n.39; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Linits of Antitrust, 63 TEx L.
REV. 1, 8-9 (1984).
88 See Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 779-80; Lazaroff, supra note 62, at 962-64. However,
Easterbrook suggests that courts are ill equipped to make economic pronouncements on the business
activity of market actors. Thus, even the rule of reason may be an inadequate tool for the assessment of
the antitrust implications of restraints of trade. Easterbrooksupra note 87, at 12.
OR Some courts have advocated an intermediate test, a "quick look" rule of reason approach. This
truncated approach inquires into the procompetitive justifications prior to condemnation of facially
anticompetitive restraints. If such a justification is advanced, a full-blown rule of reason analysis is
undertaken. However, due to the special nature of most restraints in the sports industry, the "twinkling
of an eye" approach is usually rejected in favor of a traditional rule of reason inquiry. James A Keyte,
What Is It and How Is It BeingApplied: The 'Quick Look" Rule of Reason, 11 ANTITRUST 21, 21-22 (Summer
1997). Some commentators have questioned whether any substantive difference exists betweenper se or
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Only in limited instances, where the conduct of the sports association
can be characterized as a naked restraint of trade, will courts resort to per se
illegality. In Blalock v. Ladies Professional GolfAssociation, the court concluded
that suspension of a golfer due to alleged cheating was tantamount to a total
exclusion from the professional golf market and constituted a "naked
restraint of trade."9° However, the invocation of the per se rule has not been
extended beyond such egregious player restrictions. Further, since Blalock,
even restraints on player rights have attracted the more flexible rule of reason
analysis. Subsequent decisions have distinguished Blalock and rejected per se
treatment where "the challenged rule is facially neutral and designed to
enhance the game's integrity."9'
The need for flexibility is no more apparent than with respect to sports
association equipment regulations. Rules governing play of the game itself
constitute a basic element of the administration of organized sport. The
necessity for collective action and rule making has prompted courts to
eschew the application of the per se rule in this context.92 Where horizontal
restraints on competition are vital to the availability of the product, courts
will adopt a rule of reason analysis. Therefore, the per se rule has not been
applied to NCAA rule-making authority or USGA interpretation of the
Rules of GolfY3 This position has been accepted by the majority of courts
since the Supreme Court's decision in NCAA, where the Court explained:
Horizontal price fidng and output limitation are ordinarily
condemned as a matter of law under an "illegal per se" approach
because of the probability that these practices are anticompetitive is
quick look treatment. See Gary R. Roberts, supra note 9, at 2646. For further on the applicability of the
quick look rule of reason, see Keyte, at 23-25 and Law, 134 F.3d at 1020-21.
90 Blalock, 359 F. Supp. at 1265-66. The court distinguished Deesen, another case of exclusion
from professional golf, by observing that the body imposing the exclusion was composed of non-
competitors of the plaintiff. Additionally, the plaintiff had the option to participate in tournaments
through qualification as a golf teacher. In Blalock, no such opportunity existed for the plaintiff. Id. at
1267-68.
91 Brant, 631 F.Supp. at 75, 77. The court in Brant distinguished Blalock in that the LPGAby-laws
in that case effectively prevented the plaintifffrom participating in any tournaments for a one-year period,
thus constituting a naked restraint of trade. Moreover, the court questioned the general application of the
perse rule in the sports industry, where cooperation is required for administration of the sport.
9 See Carton, supra note 61, at 100-01. "In an industry which necessarily requires some
interdependence and cooperation, theperse rule should not be applied indiscriminately. In some sporting
enterprises a few rules are essential to survival." Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652
(5th Cir. 1977), quoted in Gunter Harz, 511 F. Supp. at 1116. See also Brenner v. World Boxing Council,
675 F.2d 445, 454 (2d Cir. 1982), ert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982).
93 Weight-Rite Golf Corp. v. USGA, 1990 WL 145594 *2 (M.D. Fla.); Brant v. United States
Polo Ass'n, 631 F.Supp. 71,75 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
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so high . . . Nevertheless, we have decided that it would be
inappropriate to apply a per se rule in this case. This decision is not
based on a lack ofjudicial experience with this type of arrangement,
on the fact that the NCAA is organized as a nonprofit entity, or on
our respect for the NCAA's historic role in the preservation and
encouragement of intercollegiate amateur athletics. Rather, what is
critical is that this case involves an industry in which horizontal
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available
at all.94
However, for some courts, this pronouncement has not resolved the
problem. The per se rule's inadequacy, coupled with concern for the rule of
reason's inability to consider non-economic justifications, has led them to
develop alternative approaches.
One judicial approach seeks to incorporate one of the exceptions to per
se invalidity. In Blalock, the court considered whether sufficient procedural
protections could save condemnation of self-regulatory rules. In reviewing
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,9" the Court concluded that where no
statutory scheme justifying concerted action existed, the exemption was
inapplicable.' Absent such legislative authority, no degree of procedural
protections could save otherwise per se illegal activity. Nonetheless, other
courts have also attempted to integrate the Silver exception - this time as a
prerequisite for the rule of reason analysis. 7 However, this approach has not
canvassed significant support among the judiciary, which has preferred the
discretion afforded through application of the rule of reason analysis itself.9"
Courts continue to adopt a rule of reason analysis due to the cooperative
requirements of organized sports. Novelty was merely one factor favoring
a rule of reason. Nevertheless, antitrust litigation in the sports industry is no
longer novel. Sports regulation often has restraining effects, so consideration
of procompetitive virtues is vital in maintaining the legitimacy of sport's
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100-01. See also Law, 134 F. 3d at 1017.
9s Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
% Blalock, 359 F. Supp. at 1266-67.
97 Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgm., 325 F. Supp. 1049,1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 1971). TheDenver
Rockets test requires, (1) a legislative mandate "or otherwise" for self-regulation, (2) that the collective
action be (a) intended to accomplish an end consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation, (b)
reasonably related to that goal, and (c) no more extensive than necessary, and (3) procedural safeguards
ensuring the restraint is not arbitrary and which offer a basis forjudicial review.
g However, with respect to the sports industry, the traditional rule of reason analysis often falls
short. Thus, some courts have incorporated the reasoning of Silver and Denver Nuggets into their rule of
reason inquiry. For example, see GunterHarz, 511 F.Supp. 1103.
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governing bodies.99 Departures from a rule of reason inquiry restrain the
court's ability to assess the impugned conduct. Any constraints on the
presentation ofjustifications jeopardize not only the rule-making authority
of sports associations, but also the sports themselves. This is particularly true
where the rules govern basic conditions of play, including the nature of the
game or the equipment used.t"° Considering the added element of standard
setting present in equipment regulations, and its potential procompetitive
effects,'' it is unlikely that courts will condemn sports associations' rules of
play outright.
For the foregoing reasons, antitrust scrutiny of rule-making authority in
the sports industry is best conducted under a real of reason test. Non-profit
entities, including the NCAA, USGA and PGA, provide the strongest case
for a flexible standard of review. This is particularly so for the NCAA and
USGA, where economic motives for the limitation of sporting equipment
technology are non-existent. °2 Therefore, while the structure of organized
sport cannot immunize it from Section 1 antitrust liability through single
entity status, the rule of reason permits incorporation of many of the unique
characteristics that embody the industry. 3 However, some academics
suggest the special case of sports justifies further judicial deference:
See M&H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973,979-80 (lst Cir. 1984).
100 See Bauer, supra note 4, at 284-85; Lmv, 134 F.3d at 1018-19.
101 When "private associations promulgate safety standards based on the merits of objective expert
judgments and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by
members with economic interests in stifling product competition, those private standards can have
significant procompetitive advantages." Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 486 U.S. 492,
501 (1988).
l0 The Court inM&H Tire reached a similar conclusion with respect to a racing association which
promulgated a "single-tire" rule to ensure all competitors raced on the same rubber compound:
The fact, as here, that the combining group is not drawn from people who compete
economically among themselves, is a further ground for rule of reason rather than per se
analysis: such a combination is less likely to have been generated by an anti-competitive design
- some other motive is at work which must be weighed against any incidental anti-
competitive effects flowing from the combination.
M&H Tire, 733 F.2d at 978 n.2.
Thus, the court concluded:
We recognize that ifa regulation is adopted by an independent sanctioning organization with
no financial stake in the outcome, a court will have maximum assurance that the regulation
is to protect fair competition within the sport. But it does not follow that the absence of such
an organization absolutely precludes either a rule of reason analysis, or a successful result
under that analysis.
Id. at 982-83.
10 Bauer, supra note 4, at 277.
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Not only should these characteristics provide a sufficient basis to
avoid perse invalidity, they should also be enough to overcome liabi-
lity under the rule of reason. There is no point in recognizing that
certain industries ought to be treated differently if in fact these gen-
uine reasons for granting special treatment are ultimately ignored."°
2. MARKET DEFINITION
Before embarking on a rule of reason inquiry, the relevant market must
be defined. Market definition is critical to assessing the economic effects of
any restraint of trade."5 As a result, failure to properly define the relevant
product market will pose a serious obstacle to success in an antitrust claim. °6
In defining the market, the general principle is that two products are in the
same market "if purchasers of the products view them as being reasonably
interchangeable for the purpose for which they are produced, price, use and
qualities considered."" 7 This interchangeability may be established by
examining cross-elasticity of demand between the products or other indicia
of substitutability, including evidence of consumer or supplier responses to
price changes. However, due to the non-essential and non-functional nature
of sports industry products, traditional approaches to market definition prove
more difficult to apply."08
Therefore, some courts allude to the unique aspects of the product in
defining the relevant market. For example, in Philadelphia World Hockey Club
v. Philadelphia Hockey Club,' 9 where a new entrant challenged the established
104 Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 781. In contrast, other commentators have concluded that
application of the rule of reason is tantamount to overcoming liability. See Albert Foer, The Political-
Economic Nature ofAntitrust, 27 ST. LouisU. L.J. 331,337-38 (1983) ("With only slight exaggeration, there
is really only one thing one needs to know about the rule of reason: when the rule is applied, the
defendant virtually always wins.").
"5 Market definition issues will be revisited in connection with monopolization offences under
S 2 of the Sherman Act. See infra Part Ill(D). Market definition is key in sports industry antitrust cases
because of the rule of reason approach's prominence. In other industries, where aper se rule may apply,
market definition considerations may not arise. SeeJames L. Seal, Market Definition in Antitrust Litigation
in the Sports and the Entertainment Industries, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 737, 743 (1993).
106 See Weight-Rite, 766 F.Supp. at 1109.
107 Seal, supra note 105, at 737-38.
108 Id. at 740-41. The products' non-essential nature may prompt consumers to forgo
consumption, rather than substitute, despite a broad choice of alternatives (i.e. in the larger
sports/entertainment market).
109 Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F.Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
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league's reserve clause, the court concluded that the relevant market
consisted solely of major league professional hockey. The evidence before
the court indicated that major league professional hockey generated higher
team revenues and player salaries than other forms of hockey. Consumers
were prepared to pay a premium for games played by National Hockey
League players, and thus semi-professional or amateur players could not be
considered within the same relevant market."' A proper approach to market
definition, as conducted by the court in Philadelphia Hockey Club, must be
contextual. Consideration must be given to the impugned conduct, the
applicable liability rules, and the available relief. Otherwise, the definition
may be of minimal utility in resolving the antitrust issues encountered."'
The usual controversy with respect to market definition issues in the
sports industry centers on the sports-entertainment distinction. If a sports
league competes with the wider entertainment market, an intraleague
restriction will have a minimal anticompetitive impact on the relevant market
under the rule of reason approach. But, if the market is more narrowly
defined to exclude both other forms of entertainment and other sports, then
the potential market effects are multiplied.' Some commentators advocate
the latter approach to market definition as "more consonant with existing
antitrust policy and precedent."" 3 With respect to the product market, it is
asserted that sports leagues' treatment by consumers and advertisers merits
this narrower, submarket approach. The narrow relevant market definition
is supported by the minimal available evidence, which suggests relatively
inelastic cross-elasticity of demand between one sport and another or
between sports and other entertainment products."4
In the context of sporting goods manufacturer claims, the measure of
harm varies tremendously depending on the characterization of the market.
Thus, for example, if the market is conceived as consisting solely of
professional golfers, a USGA equipment limitation will affect a minute
percentage of sales."' However, if all golfers, professional and amateur,
constitute the relevant market, then a USGA pronouncement could have
devastating effects for manufacturers. Under the rule of reason, market
110 See Seal, supra note 105, at 760-61.
III Id. at 745. For example, Seal challenges the court's approach in NCAA, where inadequate
consideration was given to the NCAA's domination over the collegiate athletics market. Regardless of
the NCAA's position in the television market, its policies restricting the output of college football games
injured the member schools. Id. at 753-56.
112 See Lazaroff, supra note 62, at 975.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 978.
11s In fact, some golf equipment manufacturers acknowledge that the professional and amateur
player golf markets are separate. See Lombardo, supra note 18.
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definition dictates the extent of anticompetitive effects. The narrower the
definition, the more acute the harm, and the greater the potential for sports
association liability.
3. THE RULE OF REASON
The rule of reason inquiry centers on the net competitive effect of the
restraint. It involves an extensive consideration of factors relating to the
nature of the activity, the reason for its imposition, and the intended
purposes." 6 The classic pronouncement of the rule of reason approach was
delivered by the Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts."'
However, this decree provides minimal practical guidance in the application.
of the test."8 Some courts have adopted a more explicit framework." 9 First,
the plaintiff must prove significant anticompetitive effects in a relevant
market. Second, upon establishment of the primafacie case, the defendant
mustjustify the restraint through procompetitive effects in a relevant market.
Finally, if the defendant meets this burden, the onus reverts to the plaintiff,
who must show that similar benefits could be achieved through a less
restrictive alternative.' 2
116 See Scura, supra note 5, at 154-55; Brant, 631 F.Supp. at 75-76.
I11 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918).
118 As Professor Roberts has commented: "This often recited gibberish is so lacking in substantive
content that it constitutes little more than a religious ritual that courts many times have invoked to
disguise a result that is of dubious merit." Gary Roberts, supra note 9, at 2635 n.14.
119 Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
13D See Gary Roberts, supra note 9, at 2635-36.
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A predominant approach to the rule of reason analysis is that of the
Supreme Court in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 2'
under which the court balances the restraint's procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects. If the net effect, in economic terms, is one of
lessened competition, the restraint is found to violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. However, in sports industry cases, some courts have rejected
the Professional Engineers methodology.'2 Since only economic criteria are
considered under this approach, non-commercial or non-economic motives
that drive sports associations' regulation are ignored. Therefore, for example,
professional league restraints, which ensure competition among its members
and enhance the league itself as a product, would seldom be justifiable.
3
Equipment limitations, which may have no economic procompetitive merits,
would similarly fail the Professional Engineers balancing test.124 In fact, as
Professor Roberts notes, if restricted to economic criteria, all sports
association rules are injeopardy
1 21
In response to these concerns, an alternative approach to the rule of
reason analysis has developed. In Gunter Harz, a manufacturer initiated an
antitrust claim against the USTA for its adoption of an International Tennis
Federation rule effectively banning "double-strung" tennis rackets. 26 The
rule was enacted, after considerable investigation, with the intent of
eliminating rackets that induced excessive spin on the ball. 7 The court
rejectedperse condemnation ofthe USTA's conduct, and formulated a four-
part test for the rule of reason inquiry, imputed from the reasoning of Silver.
In Gunter Harz, the inquiry of the court focused on:
(1) whether the collective action is intended to accomplish an end
consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation; (2) whether the
Nat'l Soc'y ofProfl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
12 See Carton, supra note 61, at 102.
12 See Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 745-48.
124 See Carton, supra note 61, at 103-04. Another criticism of this approach is the lack ofguidance
as to the balancing process itself. For example, how arc procompetitive and anticompetitive economic
effects to be weighed against one another? What is a sufficiently procompetitive justification? See
Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 737.
12 Professor Roberts concludes:
[I]fthe NCAA rules are evaluated under S l's rule of reason with the purely economic analysis
applicable to every other industry, as Board of Regents and Law both say they should be,
virtually no substantive NCAA rule can survive. If limited solely to an assessment of their
competitive effects (i.e., impact on consumer welfare), these rules will surely be found illegal.
Roberts, supra note 9, at 2672.
"_ Gunter Harz, 511 F.Supp. at 1107.
1-7 Id. at 1109-13.
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action is reasonably related to that goal; (3) whether such action is no
more extensive than necessary; and (4) whether the association
provides procedural safeguards which assure that the restraint is not
arbitrary and which furnish a basis for judicial review. 2
After examining the regulation's rationale, the procedural protections
afforded, and the evidence presented as to the effects of the banned
equipment, the court concluded that the USTA's efforts to protect the
"character" of the game of tennis, through its adoption of the ITF rule, did
not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court assumed a deferential
position, and merely required evidence upon which the USTA and ITF
could have reasonably concluded the rule was necessary and related to its
stated purposes. The court was not prepared to substitute its independent
judgment for that of the sport's governing bodies.'
1
Unlike Professional Engineers, the approach of the Gunter Harz court
permits defendants to present non-economic factors to justify their
regulations.'3" For the sports industry, this opportunity is vital to success
under the rule of reason analysis. Additionally, the broad range of factors
meriting consideration under the Gunter Harz approach accords with the
wider latitude that courts have granted to associations in both the standard-
setting and sports industry contexts.131 In particular, as discussed above, the
unique characteristics of sports associations were insufficient to immunize
it from antitrust scrutiny, but did preventper se condemnation.', 2 Since the
traditional rule of reason approach similarly fails to acknowledge the special
requirements of the industry, a more deferential analysis is appropriate.
Allegations against governing entities such as the NCAA and USGA present
the most powerful case for judicial deference through the consideration of
I~ d. at 1116.
I d. at 1121.
130 Another alternative suggested is derived from the common law ancillary restraint doctrine,
which takes into account for the uniqueness of some businesses. Under this doctrine, "[ilfthe restraint
is merely ancillary to some other legitimate business purpose and is not intended to either harm the
market or the field of competition, the court can then feel satisfied that the restraint is merely a function
of a unique business arrangement where certain practices are recognized as harmless to the workings of
a free market." Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 738. This approach is non-commercially based in that it
accounts for the needs ofa particular industry at a given point in time. Therefore, in a sports industry case,
rules could be justified on the league's or association's need to maintain the competitive aspect of the
game itself. Id. at 738-39.
131 Gates, supra note 8, at 584-85, 640-41; M&H Tre, 733 F.2d at 985.
02 Bauer, supra note 4, at 289.
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
non-economicjustifications.' 33 Further, where the challenges relate to rules
dictating participant play, the case is again strengthened. For, in such
instances, concerns over the economic motivations of the governing body are
minimal.M
4. APPLICATION OF THE RULE
In sports industry cases, it has been argued that a traditional rule of
reason approach fails to account for the business's unique nature. Therefore,
some courts have applied a specialized test to evaluate the effects of the
restraint. However, due to the inherently commercial nature of modern-day
professional sports, and an unwavering allegiance to the ideology of
competition underlying the Sherman Act, other courts have adhered to the
balancing test extracted from Professional Engineers. An evaluation of the
antitrust implications of sports association equipment rules must account for
both these approaches. Thus, this Part will first review the judicial approach
under the balancing test, and will consider the courts' view of the potential
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects proffered by litigants. This Part
will then consider the ramifications of the Gunter Harz approach, and how
it may be applied in the context of the current NCAA and USGA equipment
rule controversies.
a. Balancing Procompetitive and Anticompetitive Effects
Under the balancing approach, the plaintiff must first demonstrate the
anticompetitive effects of the restraint. This is predicated upon proof of
market power possessed by the defendant. For without market power, no
harm can be inflicted unto competition from an agreement or conspiracy not
133 Professor Roberts warns against over-extending this deferential approach. His concern arises
due to the Supreme Court's dictum in NCAA, suggesting that most NCAA regulations are intended to
foster athletic competition and thus enhance public interest in intercollegiate sports. Roberts heralds this
view as overly presumptuous:
It seems unwarranted for a court to assume the majority of NCAA rules would survive a rule
of reason balance without any record evidence going to whether any particular rule or group
of rules ... in fact caused the public to be more attracted to intercollegiate athletics, and
without any discussion of how to weigh procompetitive effects against demonstrable
significant anticompetitive effects.
Gary Roberts, supra note 9, at 2657.
134 Id. at 291. For example, concern with USGA equipment rules should be limited, as none of
the members of the Executive Committee have any commercial relationship with any manufacturers, and
no manufacturer can become a member of the USGA. Weigka-Rite, 1990 WL 145594 *2.
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to compete. 135 Injury must be to competition in general and not merely to
a particular competitor. To satisfy this requirement the plaintiff can show a
multitude of harms: price increases, output restraints, increased barriers to
entry, constraints on technology, diminished consumer choice, etc.
In Weight-Rite, the court rejected the plaintiffs assertion of restrained
competition in the golf shoe industry resulting from the USGA ban on its
product. Weight-Rite's expert evidence contended that the USGA rule
interpretation restricted the sale of its shoes in USGA member club pro
shops. This, it was argued, prevented new entry into the market and
reinforced the concentrated market structure.136 The court found the
evidence insufficient:
At most, Plaintiffs have presented evidence from which a fact finder
could find that the USGA has the power to substantially decrease the
marketability of certain types of golf shoes and that the marketability
of Plaintiffs' shoe (as currently designed and manufactured) has been
substantially diminished. Evidence that a single competitor has been
removed from a relevant product market, in and of itself, is
insufficient to establish a violation of the rule of reason.137
To establish competitive harm, a plaintiffs focus must shift from personal
injury to the effects of the restraint on all competitors. Thus, for example,
with respect to equipment limitations, emphasis could be placed on the
impact on innovation.
In M&H Tire, the court rejected a claim of lessened incentives to
innovate. However, in that case several distinctive factors impeded the
argument's effectiveness. First, the racing association's single-tire rule
applied to a limited number of tracks. With the availability of other potential
users, the plaintiff still had an incentive to innovate. Second, the designation
of the single manufacturer occurred yearly, so incentives existed for the
plaintiff and other manufacturers to innovate and compete for the position
in subsequent racing seasons. 3 However, in many instances, where the
standards set are not temporary, anticompetitive effects can be significant.
Standard setting fixes technology at its current state and inhibits further
135 Gary Roberts, supra note 9, at 2638. In certain instances, including naked restraints on price or
output, proof of market power is not necessary, for it can inferred from the conduct itself, Id. at 2638-39.
136 Weight-Rite, 1990WL 145594 *3; Weight-Rite, 766 F.Supp. at 1110-11.
137 Weight-Rite, 766 F.Supp. at 1111.
138 M&H Tire, 733 F.2d at 987-88.
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innovation by introducing barriers to innovation.139 These concerns are
evident in the assertions leveled by manufacturers against the NCAA and
USGA concerning the current rules revisions.' 40
To counter the alleged harmful competitive effects of their restraints,
defendants in the sports industry have presented a wide array ofjustifications
for their rule-making authority. The primary procompetitive assertion by
sports' governing bodies is that their rules maintain parity within the sport
itself, and thus enhance consumer enjoyment of the sports product. Both
the NCAA and USGA have responded in this manner in their current
equipment rule confrontations. Courts, in many instances, have accepted
this justification. The promotion of competitive balance has been held a
procompetitive benefit in the context of intercollegiate athletics, 4 '
professional golf,42 and auto racing. 43 However, the claim of a positive
correlation between a sport's parity and consumer welfare is not unassailable.
First, questions may exist as to the extent that a particular rule truly enhances
competition between participants. Nonetheless, while courts may review
expert evidence evaluating a rule's effect, deference to the sport's governing
body prevails."4 Second, the relationship between enhanced parity and
increased consumer welfare is unclear. Restrictions that improve
competition may increase the attractiveness of the sports product to
consumers. Yet, antitrust law presumes that free market operations will
produce optimal prices, output and quality. Claims that restraints are
required to maximize consumer welfare should only be accepted after
considerable investigation.
45
Once the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects have been
advanced, the court must then weigh their relative merits. Minimal practical
guidance is provided by the jurisprudence." Since market restraints run
counter to the ideological underpinnings of antitrust law, a mere balance
between harmful and beneficial effects should be insufficient to justify
restrictive conduct. Consequently, courts are likely to uphold the activity
only when the anticompetitive effects are significantly outweighed by the
139 Gates, supra note 8, at 601. Other economic barriers associated with standards include
increased market risk and misallocation of R&D funds. Id. at 606-07. On the other hand, positive effects
of standards include the minimization of consumer transaction costs through quality assurance and the
creation of efficiencies through compatibility requirements. Id. at 598.
140 For example, see Easton Complaint, supra note 52, at 20.
141 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117; Law, 134 F.3d at 1023-24.
142 Deesen, 358 F.2d at 170.
143 M&H Tire, 733 F.2d at 986,989.
144 GunterHarz, 511 F.Supp. at 1111.
145 Gary Roberts, supra note 9, at 2668-69.
14 Id. at 2656; Easterbrook, supra note 87, at 13.
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procompetitive virtues. 47 In equipment rule cases, where the economic
harm may be minimal'" (if a wide market definition is adopted), and the
procompetitive benefit substantial (if the court accepts the importance of
preserving "the game"), the defendant will likely meet this burden.
The final step for the court is to determine whether the stated benefits
could have been achieved through a less restrictive alternative (LRA). The
practical difficulty is that, where the asserted benefit is maintaining parity in
play, the range of alternatives can be infinite. Strict application of the LRA
doctrine could jeopardize any proposed rule. 49 If no reasonable alternative
exists, this problem is eliminated.1 so However, in most instances, some range
of options does exist. In those cases, sports associations must select among
the alternatives. Typically, performance standards, such as those recently
implemented by the NCAA and USGA, are the least restrictive alternative.'
In fact, such standards may encourage competition - competitors innovate
to implement the best approach to satisfy the established standard.
Presumably, the choice of such standards would satisfy the rule of reason's
LRA requirement. Courts can only require the sports association decision
to be reasonable, given the available alternatives. Otherwise, all standard
,setting will become susceptible to automatic review by the judiciary. 2
b. The Gunter Harz Rule of Reason Analysis
The concern with excessive judicial interference was clearly one
motivation for the Gunter Harz court's alternative approach to the rule of
147 Id.
14 Lazaroff, supra note 62, at 986.
149 Gary Roberts, supra note 9, at 2670. Roberts questions if the LRA doctrine has any meaning
whatsoever. For example, must the alternative be of the same nature as the challenged rule? Can
aluminum bat limitations be replaced with alterations to the dimensions of the playing field?
tso In M&H Tire, the racing association desired to promote parity by requiring all drivers to race
on a single rubber compound. At trial, the plaintiff conceded that this could only be accomplished by
specifying a single brand of tire. M&H lire, 733 F.2d at 984-85.
151 Gates, supra note 8, at 651. The inferior alternative is specification standards, which operate
to fix a given design and thus discourage innovation.
152 The Fifth Circuit reflected this concern in noting.
[I]t is not enough... that the plaintiff was harmed because the defendant refused without
justification to promote, approve, or buy the plaintiff's product. Neither anticompetitive
animus nor the other elements of a S 1 claim can be inferred solely from the incorrectness of
a single business decision by a standard-setting trade association ..... An individual business
decision that is negligent or based on insufficient facts or illogical conclusions is not a sound
basis for antitrust liability.
Consol. Metal Prod., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284,297 (5th Cir. 1988),quoted in Gates, supra
note 8, at 635.
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reason analysis. Following this inquiry, sanctioning organization rules will
be upheld under the four-part test so long as they further the organization's
goals and are not applied in a discriminatory, arbitrary or capricious
manner.'5 3 The court's application of the test in Gunter Harz reinforces this
limited scope of review. First, it concluded that the collective action of the
USTA and ITF was intended to "accomplish the legitimate goals of
preserving the essential character and integrity of the game of tennis as it had
always been played, and preserving competition by attempting to conduct the
game in an orderly fashion. " "' Second, the court concluded that the USTA's
and ITF's actions were reasonably related to those goals. It found that the
evidence available to the defendants with respect to the effect of double-
strung rackets was sufficient for them to reasonably decide that the ban was
necessary for the preservation of the game.' Third, the court held that the
actions of the USTA were no more extensive than necessary. The court
observed that there was a rational basis from which the organization could
have concluded that inaction might have harmful effects on the game of
tennis. The rule drawn in response was constructed narrowly to address
those specific concerns, and thus satisfied the third requirement under the
rule of reason analysis. 6
Finally, the court assessed the procedural protections afforded by the
USTA. It concluded that the notice and comment procedures instituted
were sufficient. Consideration and incorporation of suggestions from any
interested parties, including sporting goods manufacturers, satisfied the
court's concern that the enactment of the rule was not arbitrary. 7 However,
the court noted that the mere inclusion of procedural safeguards would never
be determinative. In this vein, other courts have also cautioned against
excessive emphasis on the due process features of a rule-making body.'
Nonetheless, when incorporated as only one element of a rule of reason
153 Gates, supra note 8, at 641.
154 GunterHarz, 511 F.Supp. at 1117.
155 Id. at 1119.
156 Id. at 1121.
157 Id. at 1121-24.
1s8 In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the Supreme Court clarified the relevance of procedural
protections in the context ofper se violations of S 1:
[T]he absence of procedural safeguards can in no sense determine the antitrust analysis. Ifthe
challenged concerted activity of Northwest's members would amount to a per se violation of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, no amount of procedural protection would save it. If the challenged
action would not amount to a violation ofS 1, no lack of procedural protections would convert
it into a per se violation because the antitrust laws do not themselves impose onjoint ventures
a requirement of process.
N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293 (1985), quoted in
Brant, 631 F.Supp. at 78. See also, Gates, supra note 8, at 616-17.
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analysis, a review of the available procedures will assist in assessing the
organization's conduct.
Under the Gunter Harz approach, most non-arbitrary equipment rules
would survive the rule, of reason analysis. To the extent that the rules are
implemented to preserve the character of the game, the courts will acquiesce
to the rule-making authority of the sanctioning organizations. However,
some proactive steps should to be taken to ensure judicial deference.
Therefore, both the USGA and NCAA have incorporated substantial notice
and comment procedures into their rule-making process.'59 Consequently,
courts will continue to give wide latitude to sports associations:
[N]o court has the right to step in and dictate to a sophisticated
group of officials, duly elected, in a sanctioning organization which
sanction sports. .Such rule making functions must be delegated to
the powers of the governing body of that group and a court should
interfere only if it finds that the powers were exercised in an
unlawful, arbitrary or malicious fashion and in such a manner as to
affect the property rights of one who complains...
A membership organization.., as a voluntary organization or
one of a social nature of sports organization must be left to legislate
its own rules and its own guidelines for participation of its members
for the purposes for which it was created so long as that legislation
is not done in an unreasonable manner and without malice or
intention to harm a single member or segment of membership.
Such membership organizations have the right to adopt such rules
to protect their very existence.'O
D. Section 2: Monopolization
The purpose of Section 2 of the Sherman Act is to prevent harmful
monopolies. 6 ' Therefore, its attention is directed to a single firm's illegal
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power. By limiting unlawful
159 For example, see supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
16 STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club, Inc., 286 F.Supp. 146, 151 (S.D. Ind. 1968),quoted in
GunterHarz, 511 F. Supp. at 1117-18.
161 Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine to conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
thereof, shall be punished.
15 U.S.C. S 2 (1982).
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monopolization, antitrust law seeks to maximize consumer welfare through
competitive economic forces.' 62  To sustain a successful Section 2
monopolization claim, two elements are required: monopoly power and
exclusionary conduct. Monopoly power, in the absence of anticompetitive
conduct, is insufficient to sustain a claim under Section 2.
If the challenged activity cannot be justified by legitimate business
purposes, the exclusionary conduct requirement is likely satisfied.' 1 This
question of what constitutes anticompetitive conduct was addressed in Eureka
Urethane v. Professional Bowling Association"6 In Eureka, the PBA refused to
sanction the plaintiffs bowling ball for televised tournament play because it
bore a beer manufacturer's logo. The action was initiated as a result of
objections by NBC, one of the PBA's broadcasters, to the "free" advertising
use of the ball permitted. The court, in rejecting Eureka's Section 2 claim,
held that rules designed to protect advertising revenue were a valid exercise
of business judgment."6
Nevertheless, even if established, exclusionary conduct alone is
insufficient to substantiate an unlawful monopolization claim. Without
market power, the conduct can have no anticompetitive effects and will not
attract antitrust liability. Therefore, questions of market definition arise
again. Understandably, in a monopolization claim, plaintiffs will seek to
construct a narrow market definition to emphasize a sports association's
market power."6 In the sports industry, definition of the relevant product
market is typically most contentious. With respect to sports association
equipment rules, market definition is uncertain. Clearly, sanctioning
organizations have monopoly power with respect to the administration of the
rules of the game. Nevertheless, for manufacturers' claims, market power
must be shown in a relevant product market. As the Weight-Rite court
commented, at most the effect of a USGA equipment regulation is to
diminish the marketability of the manufacturer's product. 7 For it is likely
that, at least with respect to the broad golf equipment market, the USGA
does not possess sufficient market power for antitrust liability pursuant to
Section 2.
Nonetheless, monopolization claims have been initiated against the
USGA by manufacturers, but not pursued."6 However, participants have
162 Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 750-51; Lazaroff, supra note 62, at 955.
163 Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 75.
'64 Eureka Urethane, Inc. v. Profl Bowling Ass'n, 746 F.Supp. 915 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
6 Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 75; Gates, supra note 8, at 643.
166 Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 753-54; Seabury, 878 F.Supp. at 780.
167 Weight-Rite, 766 F.Supp. at 1111.
168 Id.
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litigated against the PGA, claiming unlawful monopolization. 69 In Deesen v.
The Professional Golfers'Association ofAmerica,"'7 the plaintiff, who had failed to
qualify under the PGA's eligibility rules, claimed the PGA and its members
had conspired to monopolize the professional golf tournament business.
While acknowledging that the PGA possessed market power, the court, in
rejecting Deesen's claim, focused on the lack of anticompetitive purpose
behind the PGA eligibility rules.' 7' The court held that no evidence had been
presented which indicated that the PGA had used its tournament sponsor
status "to preclude sponsorship of tournaments by others, to exclude golfers
from access to PGA sponsored tournaments, or to suppress or eliminate
competition in professional tournament golf."' 72
Underlying this conclusion by the court is the lack of motivation for a
sanctioning body to engage in the sort of anticompetitive behavior asserted
by sporting goods manufacturers. The USGA, a non-profit entity with no
manufacturer members, has minimal incentive to curtail competition in the
golf equipment industry. The NCAA, an organization comprising hundreds
of universities and colleges, similarly lacks an unlawful motivation to exclude
particular equipment from play. In assessing the viability of both Section 1
and Section 2 claims, courts have implicitly acceded to this reality. However,
the potential for liability, and the associated costs of litigation, continues to
restrain the rule-making authority of sanctioning bodies. Perhaps a clear
standard of partial immunity could reduce the costs associated with the
administration of professional and amateur sports. Consideration of the
approaches adopted by other jurisdictions may provide a point of departure
for a revised conception of U.S. antitrust law in the sports industry context.
E. The Canadian Approach
The potential effects of equipment standards established by sports
associations extend beyond the borders of the United States. For example,
the Rules of Golf, as administered by the USGA and the R&A, are equally
applicable in other countries, including Canada. Administration of a global
game predicates an awareness of the antitrust obligations abroad. Thus,
169 Another monopolization claim against the PGA involved a trade show promoter objecting to
PGA restrictions on the use of its trademark and logo asserted. Seabury, 878 F.Supp. at 771. The claim
was unsuccessful on the § 2 grounds for two reasons. First, the plaintiff had considerable difficulty in
defining the relevant market, which made estimation of the PGA's market share (a proxy for its market
power) impossible. Id. at 780-81. Second, the district court concluded that protection of licensirg and
use of a trademark is not an improper exercise of monopoly power. Id. at 782.
170 Deesen v. PGAA, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966).
171 Id. at 171.
172r Id.
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while substantive similarities exist between U.S. and Canadian antitrust
law,'73 sports associations will encounter significant differences. At the
general level, broadly drafted statutes and their judicial interpretations drive
the U.S. regime. In contrast, the Competition Act, the principal source of
Canadian antitrust law, is extremely detailed and comprehensive. 74 More
importantly, application of antitrust laws has been pursued with less zeal in
Canada. This may be explained by a reduced sense of commitment to the
ideal of preserving and encouraging free competition,175 or by the historical
constitutional constraints on federal government involvement.
76
Nonetheless, with its goals of maintaining and encouraging competition in
order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of its economy, Canadian
competition law is positioned to address the implications of sports association
rules.'"
The substantial difference between American and Canadian law in the
sports context is the specific Competition Act provisions covering amateur and
professional sport.7 8 Amateur sport is exempt from the Act under Section
6:
Amateur sport:
(1) This Act does not apply in respect of agreements or arrangements
between or among teams, clubs and leagues pertaining to
participation in amateur sport.
173 Paul Collins & D.Jeffrey Brown, NationalAntitrust Laws in a Continental Econoiny:A Comparison
of Canadian and American Antitrust Laws, 65 ANTITRUST LJ. 495, 497-99 (1997). See: Richard Janda and
Daniel Martin Bellemare, Canada's Prohibition Against Anti-Competitive Collusion: The New Rapprochement
With U.S. Law, 38 McGILL LJ. 620, 652, 676 (1993) (summarizing Canadian approach and comparing
U.S. S 1 analysis to Canadian partial rule of reason test under S 45); D. Martin Low, International
Cooperation in the Enforcemnent of Competition Laws: Recent Canada - United States Criminal EVerience, in
CANADIAN BARASsoCIATION, COMPETITION LAWSECTION CONFERENCE 381 (Aylmer, Quebec, 1997)
(highlighting Canada-U.S. procedures in antitrust matters, including a discussion of the August 1995
cooperation agreement between the countries).
174 Collins & Brown, supra note 173, at 497-99.
175 RJ. ROBERTS, ROBERTS ON COMPETITION/ANTITRUST: CANADAAND THE UNITED STATES
3 (2nd ed. 1992)
176 Collins & Brown, supra note 173, at 499-501.
in Ralph A. Winter, Market Power and 'Substantial Lessening of Competition" in Canadian Competition
Law: A Primer, in CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMPETITION LAW SECTION CONFERENCE 45
(Aylmer, Quebec, 1997).
178 Davies, Ward & Beck, COMPETITION LAW IN CANADA (uris) SS 1.04[81,8.10; R.J. Roberts,
supra note 175, at 408-09.
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Definition of "amateur sport"
(1)(2) For the purposes of this section, "amateur sport" means sport
in which the participants receive no remuneration for their services
as participants.. .179 (3) Professional sports are covered by the Act,
under Section 48 . . .: (5) Conspiracy relating to professional
sport... : (7) Every one who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges
with another person:
(a) to limit unreasonably the opportunities for any other person to
participate, as a player or competitor, in professional sport or to
impose unreasonable terms or conditions on those persons who so
participate, or
(b) to limit unreasonably the opportunity for any other person to
negotiate with and, if agreement is reached, to play for the team or
club of his choice in a professional league is guilty of an indictable
offence and liable on conviction to a fine in the discretion of the
court or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to
both.
Matters to be considered:
(2) In determining whether or not an agreement or arrangement
contravenes subsection (1), the court before which the contravention
is alleged shall have regard to
(a) whether the sport in relation to which the contravention is
alleged is organized on an international basis and, if so, whether any
limitations, terms or conditions alleged should, for that reason, be
accepted in Canada; and
(b) the desirability of maintaining a reasonable balance among the
teams or clubs participating in the same league.
Application:
(3) This section applies, and section 45 does not apply, to agreements
and arrangements and to provisions of agreements and arrangements
between or among teams and clubs engaged in professional sport as
members of the same league and between or among directors,
officers or employees of those teams and clubs where the
agreements, arrangements and provisions relate exclusively to
matters described in subsection (1) or to the granting and operation
of franchises in the league, and section 45 applies and this section
19 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s. 6.
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does not apply to all other agreements, arrangements and provisions
thereof between or among those teams, clubs and persons.' °
Section 48 was enacted primarily to control unreasonable restrictions on the
ability of players joining leagues from choosing which team they wished to
join. 8' To date,judicial consideration of the section has been minimal.82
As a result of the lack of judicial consideration of these sections,
questions remain as to their scope. 3 In particular, it is unclear whether rules
regulating sports equipment fall within the ambit of Section 48, or whether
resort to the general prohibitions of Section 45 (conspiracy) and 78 to 79
(abuse of dominant position)"84 is necessary. Section 48 would appear to
apply only if the equipment rules were considered "unreasonable terms or
conditions imposed" on participants. However, manufacturers, and not
participants, are typically the aggrieved parties in such claims.'8 5 Section
48(3) would then appear to apply, and criminal charges against the sports
organization would be initiated pursuant to Section 45."s
A Section 45 offence has been summarized as consisting of four key
elements: "(1) an agreement; (2) an anticompetitive purpose; (3) an "undue"
ISO R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s. 48.
181 R.J. Roberts, supra note 175, at 409.
182 Davies, Ward & Beck, supra note 178, at S 8.10.
ia3 The amateur/professional distinction is merely one preliminary matter meriting consideration.
Some entities, because of the nature of their involvement in the sport, are likely to be excluded from the
definition of"amateur." The USGA, with its sponsoring of professional tournaments, is in this category.
More questionable is the situation of entities such as the NCAA, where scholarships and other benefits
could be considered some form of remuneration. However, given that the primary goals of the NCAA
are the advancement of collegiate athletics and competition, a strong argument exists that S 6 was enacted
precisely with groups such as the NCAA in mind.
184 Section 78 includes a non-exhaustive list ofanticompetitive acts. The "common element of
the acts .. is conduct that is predatory, exclusionary, and disciplinary toward a competitor or
competitors." Collins & Brown, supra note 173, at 532-33. See Winter, supra note 177, at 56.
185 However, this is not always the case. For example, the litigants in the Ping Eye2 case included
professional golfers who claimed they could incur losses if unable to play with their preferred clubs. See
Gilder v. PGA Tour, 936 F. 2d 417 (9th Cir. 1991).
186 Section 45(1) of the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, states:
Every one who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another person:
(b) to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production of a product or to
enhance unreasonably the price thereof,
(c) to prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the production, manufacture, purchase, barter,
sale, storage, rental, transportation or supply of a product, or in the price of insurance on
persons or property, or
(d) to otherwise restrain or injure competition unduly,
is guilty ofan indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years
or to a fine not exceeding ten million dollars or to both.
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lessening of competition; and (4) intent."1 7  In general, the Act's
requirements are similar to Section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, it is
distinct from the U.S. approach in that noper se-rule of reason dichotomy is
created. All actions are measured in relation to a single "undueness"
standard."s Consideration under Section 45 necessitates an inquiry into the
effects of the impugned conduct. As such, it is akin to a rule of reason
approach in U.S. antitrust law.
As discussed above, in the context of sports association equipment
regulations, U.S. courts have customarily adopted a deferential rule of reason
analysis. A brief review of Canadian legislation reveals that, in general, sports
associations can expect to encounter similar scrutiny from Canadian
regulatory authorities. However, an important difference in the Canadian
approach is the exemption for amateur sports and the special provisions for
professional sports. This added measure of certainty, at least in certain
situations, under the Canadian system confers a significant advantage for
sports associations.1 9  With respect to amateur athletics, it insulates
governing bodies from litigation filed solely for strategic purposes. Despite
the deference shown to sports entities in the U.S., litigation is always fraught
with risk, and more importantly, expense. In the past, potential or actual
suits have forced the USGA and PGA to settle with manufacturers and thus
compromise their rule-making authority. Thus, judicial deference has
proven insufficient. Limited immunity, such as that bestowed upon
Canadian amateur sports, is a superior alternative."
IV. CONCLUSION
The goal of modern antitrust law is the maximization of consumer
welfare. This is accomplished by ensuring free and unrestricted competition,
which yields the optimal price and output levels. The fundamental question
is whether this purpose is furthered through the imposition of antitrust law
on the sports industry. Particularly in the context of sports association
equipment rules, courts have been averse to a strict application of antitrust
107 Collins & Brown, supra note 173, at 514.
188 Id. at 519.
189 The is exemplified by the paucity of cases found in the Canada, relative to the United States,
involving allegations of anticompetitive behavior by entities in the sports industry.
190 Given the U.S. experience, in particular regarding the NCAA case, complete immunity is an
unrealistic alternative. However, limited immunity in the context of sports association equipment rules
does not appear to be too great an affront to the principles of unrestrained competition. Thus, while the
Canadian position may seem extreme, it does illustrate that the U.S. approach is not the only manner in
which the subject has been addressed.
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requirements under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.' 9' Most
equipment rules have been upheld, often because they are of fundamental
importance.' 2 However, judicial deference is far from certain.
Under Section 1, many sports associations may be treated as single
entities, unable to conspire or agree to restrain trade. 93 However, the
NCAA, for example, has not received such treatment. In addition,
allegations of agreements or conspiracies with third parties, e.g. other
manufacturers, may yet have Section 1 implications. Once within the ambit
of the section, deference is the norm. Nonetheless, if a plaintiff can present
evidence to dissuade judicial deference, potential liability awaits.' 4 Section
2 monopolization claims pose a similar dilemma. In the case of equipment
rule challenges, difficulties exist both in defining the market and in
classifying the impugned conduct as exclusionary. However, at least in some
cases, findings of liability are not unattainable' 9 s
Several concerns arise from the current antitrust treatment of sports
association equipment rules. First,judicial recognition of the uniqueness of
the sports industry is inconsistent. For Section 1, it is sufficiently unique to
avoid per se treatment, but not the rule of reason analysis. Under the rule of
reason balancing test, when solely economic effects are weighed, the special
structure of the sports industry is ignored. With respect to monopolization
claims, defendants seek to deny their unusual characteristics to avoid a
narrow market definition. However, in this context, courts have concluded
that sports are not interchangeable with other forms of entertainment, and
have cited their unique aspects in support.'9 6 These inconsistencies have
caused the second difficulty with current approaches, excessive uncertainty.
Despite legitimate intentions, and minimal anticompetitive harms, sports
associations continually encounter threats of litigation. Variations injudicial
treatment have allowed threats of litigation to become a very powerful
bargaining chip.""
191 Gates, supra note 8, at 643.
92 Bauer, supra note 4, at 287.
193 Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 821.
19 Carton, supra note 61, at 107.
19 Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 821. In the sports industry, liability is more probable in relation
to input markets, including the professional player market, rather than output markets. In the latter case,
the sports product is required to compete in the general entertainment market, where its market share is
minimal.
19 Id. at 822.
197 Carton, supra note 61, at 108.
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In response to this dilemma, some commentators have concluded that
antitrust law is unable to deal with the certain aspects of the sports
industry. 9 ' However, modern sports have become too commercial, and too
integrated with other markets in the economy, to permit broad antitrust
immunity.' Conversely, a clear rule, granting limited immunity for sports
association equipment and playing rules, would not endanger consumer
welfare.2" Rather, a clear rule would confer two benefits: it would legitimate
sanctioning organization rules, thus avoiding protracted litigation; and, it
would save valuable judicial resources currently squandered on such cases.2"'
Unlike other rules, equipment standards in the sports industry are inherently
subjective, based on the governing body's conception of the character or
19 Gary Roberts, supra note 9, at 2673. Professor Roberts posits that educational motives behind
NCAA conduct unduly complicate the antitrust analysis. He concludes:
Preserving some modicum of educational integrity in the academy is simply not reconcilable
with maximizing consumer welfare in the sports entertainment marketplace. Thus, the
NCAA is an entity ofself-regulating competitors who govern a schizophrenic industry driven
by inherently conflicting values. To evaluate its rules under a statue concerned only with
maximizing competition or consumer welfare in a purely commercial context will produce
extraordinary results that will do great violence to the historic academic values (and the value
of the product) of the higher education industry.
199 Consequently, Professor Roberts does not advocate complete immunity for the NCAA.
"[I]mmunizing big-time intercollegiate athletics from the constraints ofantitrust law when it is so much
a commercially driven enterprise will do violence to the values of competition and consumer welfare, and
allow athletic programs to profit by the uncontrolled exploitation of student-athletes and consumers."
Id. at 2673-74.
Mo In a broader context, Easterbrook has suggested a series of sequential filters to prevent excessive
judicial inquiry into business activity. He suggests that the filters would shift the focus of antitrust from
ascertaining the actual effects ofconduct, which courts arc ill equipped to do, to determining whether the
conduct harms competition or consumers. Easterbrook,supra note 87, at 17. The two initial filters would
require the plaintiffto prove (a) the defendant has-market power (i.e. the ability to harm competition),
and (b) that the defendant can be enriched by harming competition (i.e. so that there exists an incentive
for the conduct). Id. After these two filters, if the restraint is nakcdi it remainsper se illegal. However,
if these requirements are not satisfied, Easterbrook suggests obviously harmless restraints would be
dismissed. Id. at 30. The remaining filters inquire into the distribution and production of firms in the
market, the potential effects on output, and the identity of the plaintiff in the antitrust suit. Only when
all the filters have been passed does the court embark on the rule of reason inquiry. Id. at 17-18. With
respect to sporting goods manufacturers, the limitation with Eastbrook's approach is that the potential for
strategic litigation by manufacturers remains. In contrast, with a rule of limited immunity, once certain
elements exist (i.e. rule relates to play ofgame, is not aimed at particular manufacturer, etc.) any challenge
to the rule can be summarily dismissed.
3DI Scura, supra note 5, at 157 n.43. "The task, then, is to create simple rules that will filter the
category of probably-beneficial practices out of the legal system, leaving to assessment under the Rule of
Reason only those with significant risks of competitive injury." Easterbrook, supra note 87, at 17.
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traditions of the game, or of parity and athletic competition.? Judicial
intervention is inappropriate. Limited immunity would finally recognize the
uniqueness of the sports industry?2' For, in the end, it remains a game.
Gates, supra note 8, at 643-44. "Sporting association standards generally fall into the category
of 'purely subjective by necessity.'" Id. at 648.
'W Success of any such proposal is predicated on accurately defining the range of rules that will
be granted limited immunity. In general, the category should include sporting association and league
equipment and playing rules enacted for the purpose of ensuring parity or preserving the character of the
game. These rules inflict minimal anticompetitive harm, and constitute an essential element for proper
administration of organized athletics.

